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Summary
Sunday shop opening is deregulated to the municipal level in the Netherlands. Despite positive
effects on economic growth and employment, many municipalities restrict Sunday shop opening.
Based on 2003 data we will show that diverse local characteristics, as the size of municipalities
and religious and political afﬁliation, play a major role in decisions about Sunday shop open-
ing. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that municipal control results in a considerable
variation in policies. As this variation is related to signiﬁcant differences between municipalities,
reasons exist to decentralize the decision on Sunday shopping opening.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the last decade European countries regularly debated about relaxing shop
opening hours legislation. As an outcome of this debate some legal restric-
tions have been relaxed for example in the UK, the Netherlands and Ger-
many. Sunday shopping became widely permitted in the UK in 1994 after
the government succeeded in pushing the Sunday Trading Act through par-
liament. The Act places no restrictions on opening hours for small shops
but restricts opening hours for shops with an area over 280 square metres
between 10:00 and 18:00. Until June 1996 Dutch shops were not allowed to
open on Sundays. Since June 1996 Sunday trading is allowed 12 times a year
and on all Sundays in tourist regions. Moreover, since June 2003 German
shops are allowed to open on four Sundays a year when there are special
events like a fair.
It is well-known from the shop opening literature that regulation of Sun-
day opening reﬂects an interesting trade-off (see, for example, De Meza
∗ We thank A.M.W. Wojcik and the CBS for providing some of the data and two anonymous
referees, M. Goos, J.S. Ferris and B. Melenberg for comments on an earlier version.
∗∗ SEOR-ECRi, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands and
Tinbergen Institute, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Room H 7-34, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR
Rotterdam, The Netherlands, e-mail: dijkgraaf@few.eur.nl
∗∗∗ Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands and
Erasmus University Rotterdam (ECRi), Rotterdam, The Netherlands
208 ELBERT DIJKGRAAF AND RAYMOND GRADUS
(1984), Kay and Morris (1987), Clemenz (1994), Gradus (1996)). As mar-
kets value externalities like social implications and religious values improp-
erly, regulation tries to internalise them. On the other hand, this regulation
reduces consumer choice. Whether beneﬁts are higher than costs, may depend
on regional or local circumstances. An important question is, therefore, which
jurisdiction should make such a trade-off. Oates (1969) proves that welfare
increases when the trade-off does take place at the level where externalities
are valued homogeneously. This means in our case that an important question
is whether municipalities differ with respect to the values attached to Sunday
shop opening externalities. If this is the case, the municipal level seems to be
the appropriate jurisdiction from an economic point of view.
The empirical literature presents only two studies that evaluate some of
the reasons for liberal or restrictive shopping laws. Price and Yandle (1987)
discuss for 25 US states the Sunday closing laws in 1970 and 1984. In 1970
they found evidence for a number of explaining variables for restrictive open-
ing policies, including religious afﬁliation, political inﬂuence and the partic-
ipation of women in the labour force. However, the 1984 results offer much
less explanatory power. Ferris (1991) presents evidence for 45 Ontario cities.
From this data it follows that higher female labour participation will decrease
the probability of choosing early closing hours and that cities with a greater
population density have more liberal laws. Due to data problems, this article
provides weak evidence for religious afﬁliation.
The Dutch policy change in Sunday opening gives us the possibility to
investigate which conditions are important for this opening. We will show,
using a dataset for all municipalities, that the preferences of consumers and
shop owners and the political afﬁliation play a crucial role in explaining this.
It is therefore important to describe the preferences of shop owners and con-
sumers and their political afﬁliation properly, as shown in section 2. In sec-
tion 3 the data are described. Section 4 presents the estimation results and
section 5 concludes.
2 PREFERENCES OF SHOP OWNERS AND CONSUMERS
The basis for our analysis is the explanation of the decision Dutch munic-
ipalities made regarding the opening of shops on Sundays. We estimate an
ordered probit model which measures the extent of shop opening days on
Sundays.1 As endogenous variable we have a variable (SOi) describing the
Sunday shop policy of municipality i. SOi takes the value one for munic-
ipalities which do not allow open shops on Sunday, six for municipalities
1 As an alternative we estimate also a binary probit model. In this model SOi takes the value
zero for municipalities which do not allow open shops on Sunday and one for municipalities
which allow open shops on all Sundays. We will discuss the results of this model only if they
differ from the ordered probit model. Full results are available on request.
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TABLE 1 – SUNDAY OPENING IN DUTCH MUNICIPALITIES
Sunday policy (SO) Municipalities % of total
1. Zero Sundays open 155 32
2. Only special days (max 5) like Boxing day 18 4
3. Less than 12 Sundays per year 129 26
4. 12 Sundays per year 96 20
5. More than 12, less than all per year 70 14
6. All Sundays per year 21 4
Total 489 100
which allow open shops on all Sundays and values within one and six for
municipalities that allow open shops on some Sundays. In these last cases the
actual value depends on the number of Sundays for which shops are open (see
Table 1).
The reasons for the differences in local Sunday shop policies are analysed
by regressing SOi on a number of municipal and consumer characteristics.
First, let us focus on the interests of shop owners. Some shop owners will
advocate that shop opening on Sundays raise the attractiveness of shopping,
especially in shopping centres with a richer diversity of shops or more special-
ized shops (Gru¨nhagen et al. (2003)). People are more interested to shop in
municipalities with a large number of shops. Thus, we include the number of
shops per inhabitants (SNi) to test whether municipalities with larger shop-
ping possibilities have a more liberal Sunday shopping policy.
Varying the number of opening hours has also effects on costs. If the num-
ber of opening hours is extended, the threshold labour volume, which is the
minimum capacity that must be present during opening hours, increases inde-
pendently of the amount of sales (cf. Nooteboom (1983), Gradus (1996)).2 As
a consequence this creates economy of scale: threshold labour counts regard-
less of the volume of sales. Cost will increase more for small shops when
opening hours are extended.
Moreover, large shops gain more from extending shop opening hours than
small shops.3 The same point has been made in allocation of time models.
In these models not only the consumed item is taken into account, but also
the foregone value of time used up. Extending shopping hours has the effects
of lowering the value of time used by allowing shoppers to choose a more
2 The economic literature also points to substantial employment effects of longer opening
hours, mainly due to an increase of threshold labour (e.g. Burda (2000), Goos (2005), Skuterud
(2005)).
3 Thurik (1984) also stresses an other advantage for large stores of extending shop opening
hours due to the fact that longer shopping hours lead to a more even distribution of custom-
ers which allows the shop to operate at a lower capacity level (e.g., number of cash points,
storage facilities, etc.).
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“convenient” time (cf. Morrison and Newman (1983), p. 110). As a result of
extending opening hours, therefore, more goods will be buyed at large stores
as these generally take more travel time, but offer lower prices. Large stores
strenghten their market posiotion in this case (e.g. Tanguay et al. (1995)).
Therefore, for two reasons more restrictive regulation of opening hours
tends to favour small stores and we include the average number of employ-
ees per shop for each municipality (SSi).4
Moreover, excessive shop opening hours in surrounding municipalities
might generate competitive pressure. If customers can shop in surrounding
municipalities, turnover will diminish in municipalities with closed shops on
Sunday. Ferris (1991) argues that retailers view shop hours as an effective
instrument to appropriate customers from rivals. We test this by including
an impact factor measuring the extent of shop opening days in surrounding
municipalities. This impact factor is calculated using the following equation:
ENi =
∑
j
SOj (1)
where ENi is the impact factor of municipality i, i is a vector of all munici-
palities, j is a vector of the municipalities with a liberal shop opening policy
in the neighbourhood of municipality i.5
Second, we focus on consumers’ interest with respect to shop opening on
Sundays. Thum and Weichenrieder (1997) argue that the possibilities to shop
during the week will be less for couples that work both. They will value
unrestricted shopping hours higher than single income families due to higher
real (opportunity) cost of time during weekdays. We include the incidence of
household with a double income (HDi) to test this proposal.
An other consumer characteristic that might inﬂuence social demand for
shop opening on Sundays is the size of the household. According to Eurostat
(2003) parents of large households spent more time at home. We include the
number of inhabitants per household (HSi) to test whether large households
value a more liberal policy higher.
Ferris (1991) argues that differences in population density across munici-
palities may inﬂuence the relative demand for Sunday opening. Customers in
low population density areas will value distance higher than longer shopping
times, increasing the possibilities for small shop owners to resist opening on
Sundays. To test this argument, population density (DEi) is also included.
Moreover, as large cities in the Netherlands are ethnically heterogeneous
societies with a diverse attitude towards Sundays, they will put more empha-
4 The dispersion of shop size would be a better proxy. Unfortunately, we have only data for
the average shop size.
5 Neighbourhood municipalities are deﬁned as those municipalities that are no further away
than 25 kilometres (17miles). Alternative assumptions with different maximum distances are
also tested.
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sis on a liberal policy. Furthermore, as shopping on Sundays is used as a form
of entertainment, larger municipalities have a better infrastructure for ‘fun-
shopping’ (e.g. Jacobsen and Kooreman (2005)). Ferris (1991), on the other
hand, argues that a rise in the number of inhabitants diminishes the number
of open Sundays. In this view, free-rider problems increase with the number
of individuals due to coordination cost. To test the effect of municipality size
we include the number of inhabitants (INi).6 As the range is quite large, we
include this variable in logs.
Besides, consumer characteristics can be based on regional differences as
well. There is some evidence that especially the provinces bordering Belgium
(Brabant, Zeeland and Limburg) with their more Burgundian tradition have
a more liberal Sunday shop policy. Another reason is the difference in excises
between Belgium and the Netherlands. According to Cnossen (2002) the
excise on unleaded gasoline is 20% higher in the Netherlands. Furthermore,
Sunday opening is allowed in Belgium for special stores as bakeries and furni-
ture stores as well as for other stores in tourist municipalities. One can argue
that cross-border shopping will speed up Sunday opening in these regions.
Ferris (2000) found that intense cross border shopping between the US and
Canada (due to a Canadian/US exchange rate that favoured US shopping)
was a major stimulus to deregulate the closing law in Ontario. This is tested
by including a dummy for the provinces (REi,k) where Groningen is excluded
as numeraire.
Third, the preferences of consumers and shop owners may reﬂect the pref-
erences of politicians. The number of Sundays are set by the municipal coun-
cil. Therefore, since 1996 many municipalities intensily debated about this
number and the preferences of different Dutch political parties have become
clear. Orthodox protestant parties (SGP and CU) are strictly against Sunday
shop opening.7 The larger Christian democratic party CDA is less strict as it
accepts compromises more easily. Based on the belief that the Sunday has a
special Christian function local politicians of SGP, CU and (sometimes) CDA
often try to keep the shops closed at Sundays. Other parties try to achieve the
same goal from a social point of view. Left-wing parties like the SP (Social-
ist Party) and PvdA (Social Democrats) sometimes play together with Chris-
tian parties to reach a majority in the local political arena. Liberal parties like
VVD (Conservative Liberals) and D66 (Left-wing Liberals) see Sunday shop
opening as a good opportunity to increase the possibilities to shop and to
stimulate the local economy. Furthermore, local political parties are impor-
tant as well in the Netherlands and in most municipalities they are related
6 Note that there may be also higher coordination costs when the number of shops increases.
This effect will be included in the coefﬁcient for SN.
7 On a national scale these parties are small (each about 2% of total votes). However, the
inﬂuence of these parties is large for some municipalities as the voters are regionally concen-
trated.
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to entrepreneurs. Therefore, in general they favour Sunday shop opening.8
Because the Sunday opening decision is taken in the municipality council, the
power of local political parties depends on the relative number of aldermen
(ALi,p).9 We include the share of aldermen from party p in total aldermen.
In the estimations the share of aldermen of local parties is excluded.10
However, the policy outcome does not only depend on the direct balance
of power in the municipality council, but also on the inﬂuence of church
members on the political parties (see also Ferris (1991, p. 1397)). Although
church and state are separated in the Netherlands, local church members
often try to inﬂuence the policy debate. Therefore, municipalities with more
active church members may show more restrictive Sunday policies.11 Recently,
Gruber and Hungerman (2006) show for the US that allowing Sunday retail
activity will lower church attendancy levels. To test this effect we include the
percentage of inhabitants that are active church members (CHi).12
3 DATA
Data for 282 Dutch municipalities on the incidence of shop opening on Sun-
days (SOi) come from a website which gives information for the situation
in 2003 (www.koopzondag.com). Data for the other 207 municipalities are
gathered using website information of these municipalities, the results of an
enquiry and direct contact with municipal representatives. We ﬁnally have
data for all 489 municipalities. There are no data available for years before
2003.
Table 1 shows how many municipalities allow for open shops on Sunday.
Of all municipalities 32% have always closed shops on Sundays. The other
extreme, all Sundays open shops, is allowed in 4% of the municipalities. In
66% of the municipalities Sunday opening is allowed in the range of only spe-
8 This point is based on a suggestion of a referee.
9 Mayor and aldermen form the executive board. The mayor, whose executive power is
limited, is appointed by the central government. The aldermen are elected by the municipal
council every 4 years. As a result of the proportional representation system only in a small
minority of the municipalities one of the parties (most times CDA or PvdA) has a majority
in the municipal council. In general, a coalition of parties has to be formed that governs the
municipality for 4 years. Each coalition party has one or more aldermen, based on the size of
the parties. The total number of aldermen in a municipality depends on the number of inhab-
itants. As long as the coalition is stable, policies proposed by the aldermen will in general be
accepted by the council.
10 Note that local aldermen have a high share in the Netherlands (27%).
11 A different interpretation of the church attendance variable is that when the number of
people going to church increases, the market size of Sunday shoppers decreases. This means
that shop owners will have fewer incentives to open their shop on Sundays.
12 In the Netherlands a large part of church members never attends church services. The
included variable is related to members that attend church services at least once per week.
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cial Sundays like Boxing day (which is called second Christmas day in the
Netherlands) to all Sundays.13
Data for the impact factor of neighbouring municipalities (ENi) follow
from the information on SOi and the average distance between municipalities.
Data for the other explaining variables are for 2003 and from the CBS (the
Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics).14 The exogenous variables are summa-
rized in Table 2.
4 RESULTS
Table 3 presents the estimations results. In the second and third column the
coefﬁcients and standard errors are presented. The last six columns present
marginal effects of these estimates on the six shop opening categories.15 If
we look at the three categories of variables, the least evidence is found for
the interests of shop owners. As the coefﬁcient for the number of shops is
signiﬁcant and positive, municipalities with a larger number of shops have a
higher probability of a more liberal Sunday policy. For instance, the probabil-
ity of 12 Sundays (i.e. when SO = 4) rises with 3.2% if the number of retail
shops in a municipality increases with one standard deviation. The interests
of small shop owners, i.e. size of shops, are insigniﬁcant and not in accor-
dance with the 1970 results presented by Price and Yandle (1987). Interest-
ingly, competitive pressure of neighbouring municipalities does not inﬂuence
shop policies.16
The results for consumer preferences are more robust and, according to
the marginal effects, larger. Municipalities with less households with a double
13 Note that we use the term Sundays also for days like Easter Monday. Traditionally shops
were not open on Sundays and special days like Easter Monday, Whit Monday and Boxing
Day (Bank Holiday). Currently, most municipalities may open shops on 12 Sundays and spe-
cial days, except for Christmas day, Easter Sunday and Whit Sunday. Municipalities in tourist
regions may open shops on every Sunday.
14 All variables are available per municipality, except for the active church member variable.
This variable is available for 42 regions. In section VI we discuss the use of explaining vari-
ables from the same year as for SOi .
15 The coefﬁcients of ordered probit models are not easy to interpret. We, therefore, calcu-
late marginal effects using the usual techniques (Greene (1997)). To make the marginal effects
comparable all marginal effects are based on a shock of one standard deviation, except for
the dummy variables (RE) which are evaluated by comparing probabilities when they are set
to 0 and 1 respectively.
16 These two conclusions depend on the estimation model. In the binary probit estimation
the probability of any shop opening increases if shops are larger and a lower probability of
closed shops on all Sundays is found when competitive pressure increases. Maybe, competitive
pressure has more inﬂuence on the decision to allow open shops or not and less on the deci-
sion how much Sundays shops may open their doors. Estimations with other values for the
maximum distance deﬁning neighbouring municipalities (10, 15 or 50 km) show that compet-
itive pressure is not always signiﬁcant. We conclude that there is only weak evidence for the
inﬂuence of competitive pressure.
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TABLE 2 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Average Max Min St.dev.
Interests of shop owners
Retail shops per 1000 inhabitants (SN ) 6 18 0 2
Size of shops in employees per shop (SS) 5 15 2 2
Impact factor surrounding municipalities (EN ) 36 91 0 23
Interests of consumers
Households with double income as % all (HD) 41 56 22 5
Inhabitants per household (HS) 2.5 3.6 1.8 0.2
Population density in ha per inhabitant (DE) 0.55 255 0.02 16
Inhabitants * 1000 (IN ) 33 737 1 56
Province (RE)a
Groningen 5 1 0 22
Friesland 6 1 0 24
Drenthe 2 1 0 15
Overijssel 5 1 0 22
Flevoland 1 1 0 11
Gelderland 15 1 0 35
Utrecht 7 1 0 25
Noord-Holland 13 1 0 34
Zuid-Holland 19 1 0 39
Zeeland 3 1 0 16
Noord-Brabant 14 1 0 35
Limburg 10 1 0 30
Political variables
Aldermen as % of total aldermen (AL)
SGP: Orthodox protestants 2 50 0 8
CU: Orthodox protestants 3 50 0 9
CDA: Christian democrats 30 100 0 18
SP: Socialistic party 1 60 0 5
PvdA: Social democrats 17 67 0 18
GL: Green left 2 50 0 7
VVD: Conservative liberals 16 67 0 18
D66: Progressive liberals 2 33 0 6
Active church members as % of inh. (CH )b 13 28 5 5
Notes: aThe average equals the number of municipalities per province as a % of the total number
of municipalities
b Number of inhabitants that attend church services at least once per week divided by total
inhabitants.
income and larger families have a higher probability to have more restrictive
Sunday policies. This is similar to Ferris (1991) and Price and Yandle (1987),
where higher female participation stimulates Sunday opening. This result is
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TABLE 3 – ESTIMATION RESULTS SUNDAY OPENING
Stand. Marginal effects on SO category:
Coef Error 1 2 3 4 5 6
Interests of shop owners
Number of shops (SN ) 1.03∗∗∗ (0.35) −5.8 −0.5 0.1 3.2 2.6 0.4
Size of shops (SS) 0.03 (0.03) −1.9 −0.2 0.0 1.1 0.9 0.1
Surrounding municip. (EN ) 0.00 (0.00) 0.4 0.0 0.0 −0.2 −0.2 0.0
Interests of consumers
Double income househ. (HD) 0.04∗∗ (0.02) −7.3 −0.7 0.1 3.9 3.3 0.6
Household size (HS) −1.75∗∗∗ (0.54) 11.7 1.1 −0.2 −6.3 −5.3 −0.9
Population density (DE) 0.10∗∗∗ (0.04) −5.5 −0.5 0.1 3.0 2.5 0.4
Inhabitants (log(IN )) 0.55∗∗∗ (0.09) −15.3 −1.4 0.3 8.3 6.9 1.2
Province (RE)
Friesland 0.16 (0.34) −4.9 −0.5 −0.3 2.7 2.5 0.5
Drenthe 0.12 (0.41) −3.9 −0.4 −0.2 2.1 1.9 0.3
Overijssel 0.85∗∗ (0.37) −20.5 −3.0 −9.2 10.4 17.1 5.2
Flevoland 0.69 (0.56) −17.3 −2.5 −6.9 9.2 13.7 3.8
Gelderland 0.59∗ (0.31) −16.5 −2.0 −3.7 9.1 10.7 2.5
Utrecht 0.16 (0.35) −5.0 −0.5 −0.3 2.8 2.6 0.5
Noord-Holland 0.29 (0.33) −8.7 −0.9 −0.9 4.9 4.8 0.9
Zuid-Holland 0.52 (0.33) −15.1 −1.7 −2.5 8.3 9.0 1.9
Zeeland 2.41∗∗∗ (0.46) −28.6 −5.5 −34.1 −8.4 27.9 48.7
Noord-Brabant 0.80∗∗ (0.34) −20.9 −2.8 −6.6 11.1 15.1 4.0
Limburg 1.21∗∗∗ (0.35) −26.3 −4.1 −15.2 11.2 24.6 9.7
Political variables
Alderman (AL):
SGP −5.53∗∗∗ (1.40) 13.8 1.2 −0.3 −7.5 −6.3 −1.0
CU −1.86∗∗ (0.76) 5.5 0.5 −0.1 −3.0 −2.5 −0.4
CDA −0.13 (0.31) 0.8 0.1 0.0 −0.4 −0.4 −0.1
SP −2.25∗∗ (1.06) 3.5 0.3 −0.1 −1.9 −1.6 −0.3
PvdA −0.33 (0.32) 2.0 0.2 0.0 −1.1 −0.9 −0.1
GL −1.26∗ (0.75) 3.0 0.3 −0.1 −1.6 −1.4 −0.2
VVD −0.26 (0.32) 1.5 0.1 0.0 −0.8 −0.7 −0.1
D66 −1.33 (0.84) 2.8 0.2 −0.1 −1.5 −1.3 −0.2
Church members (CH ) −0.09∗∗∗ (0.02) 13.1 1.2 −0.2 −7.1 −5.9 −1.0
Log likelihood −626.07
Notes: All coefﬁcients are insigniﬁcant except for coefﬁcients with */**/*** which denotes signiﬁ-
cance at the 90/95/99% level.
also in accordance with the theoretical result by Thum and Weichenrieder
(1997). The population density variable (hectares per inhabitant) is signiﬁcant
and positive suggesting that Sunday opening is more likely in a less densely
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inhabited area.17 While the marginal effects are not large, this result is not in
accordance with Ferris (1991).18
The coefﬁcient of inhabitants makes clear that there is a positive effect on
shop opening when municipalities are larger. At ﬁrst sight this result is con-
trary to that of Ferris (1991). Based on data for 45 large and medium-sized
cities in Ontario he ﬁnds a positive but insigniﬁcant relationship between size
and Sunday opening. Our results indicate, however, that size does only mat-
ter if small and large municipalities are included. Therefore, our results may
in fact be in accordance with Ferris (1991). Indeed, if we exclude the munici-
palities which have less than 20,000 inhabitants the coefﬁcient for inhabitants
is no longer signiﬁcant.
The data show also evidence for the regional differences argument. The
coefﬁcients for the provinces Noord-Brabant, Zeeland, Limburg and Overijssel
are signiﬁcant at more than 95% (compared with the reference Groningen).19
The marginal effects of these variables are quite large. These regressions imply
that there is some evidence that cross-border shopping is an important ele-
ment for the opening hour’s policy in municipalities especially adjacent to
Belgium. This is in accordance with Ferris (2000).
The results for political afﬁliation are quite clear and stronger compared
with Ferris (1991) and Price and Yandle (1987). Interestingly, all coefﬁcients
for political afﬁliation are negative compared with the benchmark. This sug-
gests that in general local parties favour shop opening. Municipalities with
more orthodox protestant (SGP and CU) aldermen show a much larger prob-
ability to have conservative shop policies. For instance, one standard devia-
tion increase in SGP-aldermen results in a nearly 14% higher probability that
shops are closed at all Sundays.20 Interestingly, the CDA-variable is insigniﬁ-
cant. Although the Christian Democratic Party has a historical foundation in
Christian religion, the inﬂuence on Sunday shop opening is apparently not
present. Evidence exist that some non-Christian parties might also stimulate a
restrictive policy. The coefﬁcient for SP shows that social considerations might
play a decisive role in the policy debate.21
17 Our conclusions do not change when the continuous variable is substituted for ﬁve urban-
isation dummies.
18 However, in our binary model this variable is insigniﬁcant.
19 The coefﬁcient of Zeeland is also signiﬁcantly different from all other provincial dummys
(based on a Wald-test). The coefﬁcient for Limburg differs signiﬁcantly from seven provincial
dummys. The coefﬁcient for Noord-Brabant only differs signiﬁcantly from Groningen, Fries-
land, Utrecht and Zeeland.
20 Maybe the presence of SGP-aldermen is more important than the share in total aldermen.
However, we cannot test this as estimations with both dummies for presence and share result
in clear multicollinear results (insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients for both variables).
21 Note that in January 2007 SP and SGP initiated a new national law aimed at reducing
the number of shop openings in touristic regions.
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The second variable measuring the inﬂuence of ideology, the incidence
of active church members, is signiﬁcant. Municipalities with more active
church member citizens have more stringent Sunday policies. If active mem-
bers increase with one standard deviation the probability of closed shops on
all Sundays increases with 13%.22
To analyse the robustness of the estimations we test for multicollinearity,
heteroskedasticity and endogeneity. None of these issues do drive our results.
For instance, as the explaining variables refer to 2003, one could argue that
some of them are not exogenous. To test for endogeneity problems we esti-
mate with 1996 data for the variables where endogeneity might be present
(SN , SS, HD, DE and IN ).23 On the basis of a Wald-test, all relevant coefﬁ-
cients are not signiﬁcantly different from our initial model. Furthermore, we
tested for spatial autocorrelation and found no evidence as well.24
5 CONCLUSIONS
Since 1996 the decision on Sunday shop opening is deregulated to the munic-
ipal level. They may allow for 12 open Sundays per year or even open shops
on all Sundays when they are in a tourist region. Still, in 32% of the Dutch
municipalities shops are closed on every Sunday in 2003. Drawing on various
theoretical arguments an ordered probit model was estimated to explain the
occurrence of restrictive Sunday opening. It is shown that especially political
and religious afﬁliation, the number of inhabitants and regional differences
are important to explain the variation between municipalities. The number
of shops, population density and household characteristics are signiﬁcant as
well, although their inﬂuence is smaller according to marginal effects. There
is very weak evidence for excessive competition with neighbouring municipal-
ities, while cross-border shopping may play a role.
The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that municipal control over
Sunday shopping hours results in a considerable variation in policies. As this
variation is related to signiﬁcant differences between municipalities, deregula-
tion to the local level allows municipalities to take account of local charac-
teristics. Clearly, by taking into account these differences a clear-cut case exist
to decentralize the decision on Sunday shopping opening compared with rules
on a national level.
22 Interestingly, variables representing the incidence of church members that are less active
(in terms of the number of times they attend services) are not signiﬁcant. Results are available
upon request.
23 We do not have data before 1996. However, it is not reasonable to assume that already
in 1996 signiﬁcant effects result from changes in Sunday shop opening in the second part of
1996 as all variables require considerable time to change. Note furthermore that we do not
use the results with the 1996 data in the former paragraph as we have less data for 1996 (448
instead of 489).
24 Full sensitivity analyses are available on request.
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In this paper we only investigate the policy decision by the municipality.
Less restrictive policies do not necessarily imply that all shops are in fact
open at Sundays. There is some evidence that especially food and furniture
stores make use of a more liberal policy. In large cities also shopping centres
and special stores are open. Future research might generate more insight in
the opening decision of show owners when data are available about the open-
ing hours of individual shops.
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